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In this paper, we critically reflect on the concept of Euthanasia as understood in the West and 
in Africa, and especially in sub-Saharan Africa. From the Western block, we rely on the 
contributions of Ronald Otremba and James Rachels. In our view, Otremba represents the 
Traditional Western view of euthanasia, which holds that life is sacrosanct and therefore 
ought not to be taken away for whatever reasons. Otremba’s defense of passive euthanasia 
over active euthanasia stems from this understanding. Rachels, on the other hand, does not 
see any morally significant difference between active and passive euthanasia, for the simple 
reason that the result is the same - death. Next, as we examine the African view of euthanasia 
with special reference to Munyaradzi Mawere’s interpr tation of the Shona position on it, we 
want to ascertain whether or not there is something that can be called African euthanasia, and 
if not, whether or not the understanding of euthanasia in Africa has Western roots. 
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Introduction 
Incisive research into the concept of euthanasia is very scarce in Zimbabwe: only Munyaradzi 
Mawere’s article titled “The Shona Conception of Euthanasia: A Quest to Depart from 
Zimbabwe Tradition” (2009) has delved into this subject at considerable depth. It is our 
submission that although Mawere has done a sterling job as the first Zimbabwean to discuss 
the morality of euthanasia from the perspective of the Shona1 people of Zimbabwe, it is not 
clear whether the idea of euthanasia that he is referring to has African roots, or it is simply an 
application of the Western concept of euthanasia to the Shona context. 
In this paper, we interrogate Mawere’s discussion on euthanasia and expose its deficiencies. 
We set out by defining the term euthanasia, focusing on the decision-making processes 
involved in its administration, as well as on its practical aspects. We then explore the merits 
and de-merits of the traditional Western view of euthanasia, focusing on the contributions of 
                                                 
1The Shona people constitute the largest ethnic group in Zimbabwe, and the Shona language has six different 
dialects, namely, Karanga, Korekore, Kalanga, Manyika, ZezuruandNdau (See Mangena 2012, 63-64). 
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Ronald Otremba and James Rachels. Next, we reflect on the Shona people’s perceptions of 
euthanasia as interpreted by Mawere (2009, 101-115). In this regard, we are guided by the 
following questions: 
• Are the requirements for the definition of euthanasia by the West - which Mawere 
seems to be endorsing without critical thought - cast in stone? 
• Could there be a distinctively African type of euthanasia which does not need to 
satisfy the criteria for euthanasia as defined by the West? 
As we seek to answer the questions above, we cite sev ral cases in Shona society which, in 
our view, have some striking similarities with the Western conception of euthanasia. We seek 
to determine whether or not these cases point to the idea of euthanasia as understood in the 
West, or if they point to an idea of euthanasia that is rooted in Africa. 
Euthanasia: Definitions and Distinctions 
The Daily News of July 5, 2013 carried a story on its second page titled: “Family advised to 
turn-off Mandela’s life support”. According to this story, doctors treating Nelson Mandela 
said he was in a “permanent vegetative state”, and advised his family to turn-off his life 
support machine(The Daily News, 2013, 2). The story further claimed that “Rather than 
prolonging his suffering, the Mandela family is exploring this option as a very real 
probability” (2013, 2). 
This story and many others have re-ignited the long-standing debate on whether the practice 
of euthanasia - which it alludes to - is conceivable inAfrica. We would not be surprised if 
Zimbabweans and South Africans who read that story were to be shocked by the move by 
these South African doctors, and also by the fact tha he Mandela family seemed to be 
buying into this idea, given that in Africa, it is not every day that one hears about euthanasia 
being administered in hospitals. For many contemporary Africans, the very thought of 
euthanasia is unacceptable, as they are convinced that their culture prioritizes and protects 
life in all circumstances. At best, the idea of euthanasia largely remains foreign. With regard 
to the Mandela case, prominent Zimbabwean sociologist, Claude Mararike, remarks: 
Harbouring such feelings, as the Mandela family did, is tantamount to kuroya 
(practicing witchcraft). The mere thought of entertaining the idea of allowing 
doctors to turn-off Mandela’s life support machine (passive euthanasia) by the 
Mandela family is in itself a failure to appreciate how the African values life 
(Mararike 2013). 
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Mararike (2013) argues that African,s particularly the Shona people of Zimbabwe, consider 
kuroya as one of the worst evils on earth, and that it isas good as murder itself. Mararike 
(2013) also believes that Africans value life because they are afraid of the menacing ozi 
(avenging spirits) which may come back to haunt them in the long run (cf. Mawere 2009, 
106; Mangena2012, 70). However, as we shall see latr in this paper, this is not to suggest 
that as Africans we do not have cases that have striking similarities with the Western concept 
of euthanasia. In the meantime, we will sample the definitions of euthanasia available, and 
outline and explain the decision-making processes involved in its administration. 
According to Campbell and Collinson (1988, 121), an act of euthanasia involves at least two 
people. Campbell and Collinson argue that when defining euthanasia, one must consider the 
rationality and morality of any decisions taken by the one who is to die (the patient) or his or 
her family representative (the significant other), inasmuch as one must also consider the 
rationality and morality of the decisions taken by the one who will administer the act of 
euthanasia (the physician), and the setting in which it will be administered (Campbell and 
Collinson 1988, 121). 
Yet what is even more critical in the definition of euthanasia is the issue of considering the 
rationality and morality of any decisions to be made by the patient or his or her family 
representative, as these point to the importance attached to patient autonomy in all discourses 
involving the practice of euthanasia. So, what is euthanasia? Etymologically, the term 
euthanasia has Greek roots, with eu meaning “well” or “good”, and thanatos meaning death. 
Thus euthanasia literally means “good death” (Mackinnon 1998, 24; Kuhse 1991). Closely 
related to this definition is the one by the Concise Oxford Dictionary, which defines 
euthanasia as gentle and easy death, and the bringing about of this in cases of incurable and 
painful disease(The Oxford English Dictionary 1989, 444). Both definitions require further 
interrogation. 
With regard to the first definition, it is important to note that while the term itself implies that 
there can be a good death, in itself, it does not tell us when or under what conditions death is 
good, that is, is good death one that comes suddenly or after some time to think about and 
prepare for it? Is it one that takes place at home and in familiar surroundings or one that 
occurs in a medical facility? Is it one that we know is coming and over which we have control 
or one that comes upon us without notice? (Mackinnon 1998, 124-125). 
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The problem with the second definition is that it does not tell us whether or not euthanasia is 
the same as murder. All sorts of murders might be procured in ways which are “gentle and 
easy” without there being the slightest temptation t  call them acts of euthanasia. The 
distinction between euthanasia and murder is clarified by Phillipa Foot (1978, 34), who 
asserts that “it is the qualification that the killing must be done for the sake of the one who is 
to die that will distinguish euthanasia from straightforward death.” By extension, it is the 
imperative that the death satisfies the four criteria cited above that will also distinguish 
euthanasia from straightforward death. 
We have no doubt that the questions raised above regarding the first definition of euthanasia 
have no easy answers. We also have no doubt that the issue of the distinction between 
euthanasia and murder is critical if we are to adequately understand the concept of 
euthanasia. 
Nevertheless, we do not intend to spend considerable time discussing these questions and 
raising alarm on the issue of the distinction betwen uthanasia and murder. Instead, we are 
keen to find out if the concept of euthanasia is present in indigenous African thought. 
However, before we do this, it is critical to outline and reflect on the decision-making 
processes involved in the administration of euthanasia. These decision-making processes, 
which also serve as sub-types of euthanasia, are Voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary 
euthanasia. It is at this level that ethical issues on euthanasia arise. Voluntary euthanasia 
occurs when the person whose life is at stake makes  decision about what is to be done 
(Mackinnon1998, 128). In short, the person whose life is at stake is the one who requests to 
die because of his or her unbearable condition. Involuntary euthanasia takes place when the 
physician, upon careful moral assessment, decides to end the patient’s life - especially if 
recovery is not reasonably expected. This decision can be taken even if the patient clearly 
expresses a wish to live (Campbell and Collinson 1988, 23).  
Those who initiate the death of a person normally appe l to the principle of mercy which 
establishes two important duties, namely, “the duty not to cause further pain and suffering” 
and “the duty to end pain and suffering already occurring” (McDonald 1981, 160). Non-
voluntary euthanasia is administered in cases where people cannot make informed consent 
probably because they are ver young children (newborns), severely brain damaged or they are 
adults in a vegetative state. In such cases, neither consent nor the lack of it can be said to be a 
factor (Campbell and Collinson1988, 123). 
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At the level of implementation, two things happen: Either the physician decides to end the 
life of the patient actively, that is, by administering a lethal injection, prescribing an overdose 
of sleeping tablets or other means on grounds of mercy, or the physician may simply decide 
to do nothing to prevent death from occurring (May 1994). 
Having defined euthanasia, we shall next consider th  contributions of two Western moral 
philosophers on this issue, namely, Otremba (1995) and Rachels (cited in Mappes and 
Zembaty 1997). 
Western Conceptions of Euthanasia 
The distinction between active and passive euthanasi  is crucial in Western Medical Ethics. 
The idea is that it is permissible, at least in some cases, to withhold treatment to allow a 
patient to die, but never permissible to take any direct action designed to kill the patient 
(Otremba cited in Mappes and Zembaty1997, 61). Thisdoctrine seems to be acceptable to 
most medical doctors in the West. For example, it is endorsed in a statement by the House of 
Delegates of the American Medical Association as follows: 
The intentional termination of the life of one human being by another - mercy 
killing - is contrary to that for which the medical profession stands and is 
contrary to the policy of the American Medical Association. The cessation of 
the employment of extraordinary means to prolong the life of the body when 
there is irrefutable evidence that biological death is imminent is the decision of 
the patient and/or his immediate family (AMA extract, in Mappes and 
Zembaty 1997, 61). 
Ronald Otremba is one of the defenders of the traditional Western view of euthanasia, which 
holds that passive euthanasia is morally permissible while active euthanasia is not. In 
defending this claim, Otremba (1995, 22) dismisses active Euthanasia for two reasons. First, 
it violates the principle that life itself is intrinsically valuable. This value is independent of 
one’s physical or mental state of health, and is baed on the principle that God is the sole 
creator of life and has sovereign authority over life and death. Second, Otremba argues that 
although the principle of autonomy states that the individual has a right to self-determination, 
this principle is not absolute, as it is subject to a higher authority or good. 
However, in his response to the Traditional Western view of euthanasia in general and to 
Otremba in particular, James Rachels begins by givin  an example which seeks to illustrate 
that there is no moral difference between active and passive euthanasia. He begins his 
argument thus: 
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A patient who is dying of incurable cancer of the troat is in terrible pain, 
which can no longer be alleviated. He is certain to die within a few days, even 
if present treatment is continued but he does not want to go on living for those 
days since the pain is incurable. So he asks the doctor for an end to it and his 
family joins in this respect (Rachels quoted in Mappes and Zembaty1997, 62). 
Rachels calls on us to suppose the doctor agrees to withhold treatment, as the conventional 
doctrine says he may. The justification for doing this would be that the patient is in terrible 
agony, and since he or she is going to die anyway, it would be wrong to prolong his or her 
suffering needlessly. But now notice this: if one simply withholds treatment, it may take the 
patient longer to die, and so he or she may suffer more than he or she would if more direct 
action were taken and a lethal injection given. For Rachels, this fact provides a strong reason 
for thinking that once the initial decision not to prolong his or her agony has been made, 
active euthanasia is actually preferable to passive euthanasia, rather than the reverse (Rachels 
quoted in Mappes andZembaty1997, 62). 
Rachels proffers a further illustration to support his view that there is no morally significant 
difference between active and passive euthanasia: 
In the first example, Smith stands to gain a large inh ritance if anything should 
happen to his six year old cousin. One evening while the child is taking his 
bath, Smith sneaks into the bathroom and drowns the child and then arranges 
things so that it will look like an accident. In the second, Jones also stands to 
gain if anything happens to his six year old cousin. L ke Smith, Jones sneaks 
in planning to drown the child in his bath. However, just as he enters the 
bathroom, Jones sees the child slip and hit his head, and fall face down in the 
water. Jones is delighted; he stands by, ready to push the child’s head back 
under if it is necessary, but it is not necessary. With only a little thrashing 
about the child drowns all by himself, “accidentally,” as Jones watches and 
does nothing (Rachels quoted in Mappes and Zembaty 1997, 63).  
Rachels argues that Smith killed the child, while Jones “merely” let the child die: that is the 
only difference between them. Did either man behave better, from a moral point of view? If 
the difference between killing and letting die were in itself a morally important matter, one 
should say that Jones’ behavior was less reprehensibl  than Smith’s (Rachels cited in Mappes 
and Zembaty 1997, 63). Rachels argues that the cases of uthanasia with which doctors are 
concerned are not like this at all: they do not involve personal gain or the destruction of 
normally healthy children. Instead, doctors are concer ed only with cases in which the 
patient’s life is of no further use to him or her, o  in which his or her life has become or will 
soon become a terrible burden. However, for Rachels, the point is the same in these cases: the 
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bare difference between killing and letting die does not, in itself, make a moral difference 
(Rachels cited in Mappes and Zembaty 1997, 64). 
Euthanasia and the Shona Experience 
Having outlined the two extreme views in the Western conception of euthanasia as 
represented by Otremba and Rachels, we now turn to euthanasia and the African experience. 
We are very careful not to use the phrase “the African view of euthanasia”, for this would 
imply that we have something called “African euthanasia” which is different from 
“euthanasia in Africa”, and yet this is the subject of our investigation. The designation 
“African euthanasia” means euthanasia that originates from Africa, while the designation 
“euthanasia in Africa” refers to euthanasia that is found in Africa but has Western origins. As 
we reflect on euthanasia and the African experience, we begin our discussion by re-visiting 
Munyaradzi Mawere’s position on euthanasia, especially mong the Shona people of 
Zimbabwe. 
Munyaradzi Mawere on Euthanasia among the Shona 
In an article titled “The Shona Conception of Euthanasia: A Quest to Depart from Zimbabwe 
Tradition”, Munyaradzi Mawere (2009, 101-116) asserts that the Shona people are against the 
idea of euthanasia, and that their opposition to itis cultural, and is captured in Shona proverbs 
(tsumo), idioms(madimikira) and folktales(ngano) (Mawere 2009, 105). He also thinks that 
the Western view of euthanasia is basically the same s the Shona one (Mawere 2009, 105). 
For instance, he quotes Thomas Aquinas who argues that “everything naturally loves itself 
and, every part as such belongs to whole which translates to the point that every man is part 
of the community” (Mawere 2009, 105). 
Mawere also quotes McDonald (1998, 159) who postulates that by having his or her life 
terminated, the patient injures himself or herself and the community to which he or she 
belongs. For the Shona, choosing death in whatever circumstances is considered harmful, 
destructive and a loss not only to the bearer of the life, but also to family, friends and the 
community to which the one whose life is terminated is a member (Mawere 2009, 105). 
Mawere cites a proverb which points to the fact thae Shona people are against euthanasia: 
“Murwere haa rerwi nebonde” (“A sick person cannot be nursed by a sleeping mat”). For 
Mawere, nursing a sick person by means of a sleeping mat is like applying passive euthanasia 
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to him or her (Mawere 2009, 106). Thus according to Mawere, the Shona people are not only 
against active euthanasia, but passive euthanasia as well. 
In addition, Mawere believes that in Shona culture, p ople involved in all forms of killing 
including euthanasia risk being haunted by ngozi (avenging spirits) of the people they will 
have killed (Mawere 2009, 106). With reference to the mode of operation of ngozi, Mangena 
(2012, 70) reports that ngozi may strike viciously by not only targeting the pertrator of the 
crime, but also his kinsmen. Mangena shares this position with Emmanuel Ribeiro (cited in 
Mawere 2009, 106), who notes that the avenging spirit can cause a series of inexplicable 
deaths, diseases and other inexplicable misfortunes o  the murderer and his or her family. 
Furthermore, Mawere remarks that the other Shona proverb which shows that euthanasia is 
not tolerated in Shona culture is “Usarasa chirimumaoko nekuombera (“Do not lose what is 
already in your hands by clapping”). He thinks that this proverb can be applied to life itself - 
that a patient should be contented with the life he or she has, as no one knows what the future 
holds or whether there is another life beyond the grave. Mawere cites a scholar by the name 
J.G. Williams, whose slippery slope argument on euthanasia is comparable to the attitude of 
the Shona people as he observes that “if a person who is apparently hopelessly ill may be 
allowed to take his own life, then he may be permitted to deputize others to do it for him 
should he no longer be able to act … This may incline other people to act on behalf of other 
patients who have not authorized them to exercise their judgment.” 
Having reflected on the position of the Shona peopl on euthanasia which, for Mawere, 
stipulates that euthanasia is always wrong, Mawere r commends a moderate view of 
euthanasia. According to this latter view, euthanasia is not a fundamental right for anyone, 
but rather a prima facie obligation, so that each case ought to be treated s special in its own 
right. This means that the moral rightness or wrongness of euthanasia is determined by the 
circumstances that surround each case (Mawere 2009, 1 9). In short, Mawere believes that 
there are cases in Shona society that should warrant euthanasia and others that should not. He 
gives the example of the defective newborns, that is, children born with blindness, deafness 
and extremely low intelligent quotient that must have ll their needs taken care of by others. 
He thinks that life is meaningless to such children, and that they should be allowed to forego 
such lives: “Though some would say that the prospectiv  lives of many defective newborns 
are modestly pleasant … justice will be done if such lives are terminated” (Mawere 2009, 
110). 
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Mawere gives another example of a thirty year old man who is critically injured in a car 
accident, resulting in the amputation of his hands and legs; he has become blind and his face 
is deformed; his body is continually bleeding and he is not sleeping at night because of 
unbearable pain, and he has lost a bit of his sanity as a result. For Mawere, this case will 
warrant euthanasia, as any fair-minded person would judge that this kind of life is not worth 
living (Mawere 2009, 111). 
It is clear that throughout his reflections, Mawere is not asking: “Does euthanasia exist in 
Shona society?” Instead, he is asking: “What are thmoral issues surrounding the 
administration of euthanasia in Shona society?” To him the question of whether or not 
euthanasia exists in Shona society is not that important. In contrast to Mawere, We consider 
this to be a pertinent question which we are trying to address. What do we make of Mawere’s 
assertion that the Shona have a dismissive approach t  the question of euthanasia? What do 
we make of his moderate view? 
In our opinion, it is misleading for Mawere to suggest that euthanasia is always unacceptable 
in Shona society even before he establishes whether or not it existed in that society, and if it 
did, whether or not it continues to exist in it today: Mawere should have undertaken thorough 
research before making such a claim. In fact, our research findings, which are based on oral 
literature, indicate that in pre-colonial Shona society,certain cases of “euthanasia” were 
sanctioned. However, we are not sure whether these wer explicit cases of euthanasia as 
defined by Campbell and Collinson (1988), Foot(1978), Otremba (1995) and Rachels (cited 
in Mappes and Zembaty 1997). This is why we are putting quotation marks around the word 
euthanasia - to show that it is a contestable concept. Nevertheless, we think that the present 
generation of the Shona people may still believe in uthanasia because it is not alien to their 
culture. Below we outline and examine these cases. 
Cases of “Euthanasia” in Pre-colonial Shona Society? 
As we explore the idea of euthanasia beyond the confines of Europe and America, it is 
important not to lose sight of the fact that we are dealing with concepts that vary from culture 
to culture. For instance, we have noted that in the context of the West, euthanasia has been 
defined within the framework of four critical aspects, namely, the Physician, the Patient, the 
Significant Other and the Clinical setting. We have lso seen that in the context of the West, 
the concept of informed or proxy consent on the part of the patient is of critical importance. 
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Other cultures may consider different sets of issue to be pivotal in determining whether or 
not to facilitate “euthanasia”. 
It seems that without either informed or proxy consent, it would be difficult to say an act of 
euthanasia has taken place - a view supported by scholars such as Campbell and Collinson 
(1988), Foot(1978), Otremba (1995) and Rachels (cited n Mappes and Zembaty 1997). 
While this is the case with regard to the Western co ception of euthanasia, we are of the 
opinion that the Shona experience is somewhat different. Indeed, Africa is awash with cases 
that somehow point to euthanasia, but do not satisfy each of the four aspects we mentioned 
above, namely, the physician, the patient, the significa t other, and the clinical setting. Our 
task is to determine whether or not these are cases of uthanasia in the African sense, and, 
more specifically, in the Shona sense. Below we examine some of the cases in pre-colonial 
Shona society, where oral literature attests to the fact that the idea of killing to alleviate 
suffering was in existence. In a wide ranging interview with Sekuru Jimitias Karevo (82) of 
Harare but who is originally from Matepatepa in Bindura, we learnt that cases of killing for 
the benefit of the sick or the terminally ill were common in pre-colonial Shona society. 
Karevo begins by citing a case in which an elderly person, preferably a man, would get into 
the room of a terminally ill person as if to assess hi  or her condition, and strangle him or her 
to death, after which he would close his or her eyes and mouth (Karevo 2013). Upon leaving 
the room, he would pronounce the person dead to those waiting to enter the room. This was 
done out of the realization that the terminally ill person had endured much pain, and that 
there was need to “help” him or her to rest. 
Mararike (2013) also cites a number of cases in Shona society in which killings were 
administered to alleviate suffering or to fix a social problem. He begins by citing a case 
involving people who were suffering from leprosy: 
Munguvadzekare, vanhu vane maperembudzi vaiswakumusasa kunze 
kwemusha kutivasasangana nevanhu vasina, ndikokwavaipirwa chikafu 
asivaizongopedzisira vafavariikoko nokuti vanga vasingarapwi sezvo 
kwakanga kusinamushonga wemaperembudzi. 
(In pre-colonial Zimbabwe, people afflicted with leprosy were isolated so that 
they would not come in contact with the rest of thegroup and they would 
normally die as there was no cure for the disease). 
Mararike (2013) further notes that such killings were not only applied to the terminally ill, as 
certain circumstances, including famine and war, also forced society to administer them: 
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During times of famine, families would choose to starve to death those who 
were advanced in age in order to save children. In times of war, families 
would run away from their enemies but because of the extended nature of 
most traditional families, it was difficult to run away as a group so it was a 
common practice to run away leaving behind those who ere advanced in age 
and they would die as a result of fatigue or attack by enemies (Mararike 2013). 
We found out that in other instances, some Shona communities would perform a ritual that 
involved the setting up of a riva (mystical trap) at a hidden place on a mountain. As long as 
the trap remained active, they would live on. However, when they became too old, they 
would ask their vazukuru (nephews) to go and trigger the trap: only then would they die. 
Are the cases above similar to euthanasia as understood by Western scholars such as 
Campbell and Collinson (1988), Otremba (1995) and Rachels (cited in Mappes and Zembaty 
1997)? Is the concept of euthanasia as presented by these scholars cross-cultural? 
With regard to the first case recounted by Karevo ab ve, it would appear that it is close to 
active euthanasia or mercy killing, since it satisfies one criterion of the Western definition of 
euthanasia, namely, that “a killing is done for thesake of the one who is to die” (Foot 1978, 
34). However, this is not the case since no Physician was involved in this act of killing, the 
killing was not done in a clinical setting, and no consent was obtained from either the patient 
or his or her representative. With regard to the second and third cases recounted by Mararike 
above, it would also appear that the same criterion of Western-type euthanasia is satisfied but 
the others are not. 
As for the case of the mystical trap cited above, one can argue that the four criteria for the 
definition of euthanasia presented by Campbell and Collinson (1988), Foot (1978), Otremba 
(1995) and Rachels (cited in Mappes and Zembaty 1997) are not satisfied because there is no 
physician, patient or the patient’s proxy involved in this ritual. Besides, the environment is 
not even remotely clinical, as no one is sick. However, the fifth criterion , that is, consent, is 
satisfied since the man who is choosing to have his riva triggered by his or her muzukuru in 
order to die is doing it out of freewill. The criterion of euthanasia which requires that it be a 
killing done for the sake of the one who is to die is also satisfied. 
Thus in our view, all the cases cited above, notwithstanding the fact that they do not satisfy 
all the criteria for the Western concept of euthanasia, point to euthanasia in the African sense. 
This is only so if the definition of euthanasia is re tricted to “an act of killing that is done for 
the sake of the one who is to die” (Foot 1978, 34). This would mean that the definition of 
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euthanasia in Africa is very broad, encompassing killings that have nothing to do with 
terminal illness. 
Conclusion 
We have explored the concept of euthanasia, tracing it from its Western roots, and showing 
how it is understood in the Shona society of Zimbabwe. We have noted that there are cases in 
Shona society that bear striking resemblance with eu anasia as defined by Western scholars. 
However, we have observed that this resemblance alone cannot justify categorizing these as 
cases of euthanasia, at least going by the Western criteria for the definition of euthanasia that 
stipulate that an act of euthanasia requires the presence of a physician, a patient, a significant 
other, a clinical setting, and informed or proxy consent on the part of the patient. In our 
attempt to describe the cases that we found in Shona s ciety as euthanasia, we only utilized 
the criterion which states that euthanasia is an act of killing that is done for the sake of the 
one who is to die. We then inferred that the concept of euthanasia in Shona society was 
broader in scope than the Western conception of it.
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